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ARTICLES
ENABLEMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY CASES
AFTER IN RE GOODMAN
John C. Todaro'
INTRODUCTION
One of the most ubiquitous issues in patent law is whether a
patent or patent application is "enabling." To be considered en-
abling, the patent or patent application must sufficiently disclose
the elements of an invention to allow a person skilled in the art to
make and use the invention. This legal issue, often referred to as
the "enablement requirement,"' arises in the course of both patent
prosecution and patent litigation.
The enablement requirement was part of the original federal
patent law statute, the Patent Act of 1790.2 Today, patent examin-
ers and courts generally look to the patent specification, which
discloses or describes the invention, to determine whether an appli-
cation is enabling. In that regard, 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
directs:
* B.S., Providence College; J.D., Pace University School of Law. The author is a
registered patent attorney, associated with the firm of Wyatt, Gerber, Burke & Badie in
New York, New York.
1. 2 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 13.04[5][b], at 13-45
(2d ed. 1994).
2. See id. § 7.02[1]. In pertinent part, the Patent Act of 1790 stated that the patent
must contain a description of the invention sufficient
to enable a workman or other person skilled in the art of manufacture, whereof
it is a branch, or wherewith it may be nearest connected, to make, construct or
use the same to the end that the public may have the full benefit thereof, after
expiration of the patent term.
Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109.
For a detailed review of the statutory embodiments of the enablement requirement,
see 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 7.02 (1991).
2 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.3
The theory behind the enablement requirement, and the patent
statutes in general, is that in exchange for the full disclosure of an
invention, the inventor is granted the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention for a term of seventeen
years.4 Thus, as Donald Chisum comments:
[F]ull disclosure of the invention and the manner of making
and using it on issuance of the patent immediately increases
the storehouse of public information available for further
research and innovation and assures that the invention will
3. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). The contents of a proper specification are further set
forth in the regulations promulgated pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.71 (1993), which states in
pertinent part:
(a) The specification must include a written description of the invention or-
discovery and of the manner and process of making or using the same, and is
required to be in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art or science to which the invention or discovery apper-
tains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.
(b) The specification must set forth the precise invention for which a patent is
solicited, in such a manner as to distinguish it from other inventions and from
what is old. It must describe completely a specific embodiment of the process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter or improvement invented, and
must explain the mode of operation or principle whenever applicable. The best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention must be set
forth.
(c) In the case of an improvement, the specification must particularly point out
the part or parts of the process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter
to which the improvement relates, and the description should be confined to the
specific improvement and to such parts as necessarily cooperate with it or as
may be necessary to a complete understanding or description of it.
37 C.F.R. § 1.71. See also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01 (1994)
[hereinafter MPEP]. The MPEP contains instructions to patent examiners, and is pub-
lished for the benefit of examiners as well as for patent applicants and attorneys. The
MPEP does not have the force of law. See MPEP foreword (1994).
4. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989)
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988)).
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be freely available to all once the statutory period of mo-
nopoly expires.5
The application of the enablement requirement to the fast-grow-
ing field of modem biotechnology has created a complex body of
case law. Modem biotechnology involves the use or engineering
of the principles of "cell and tissue culture, cell fusion, molecular
biology, and... recombinant deoxyribonucleic (DNA) technology
to generate unique organisms with new traits or organisms that
have the potential to produce specific products.",6
The biotechnology industry has grown at a "stunning" rate over
the last fifteen years. 7 According to Roger C. Herdman, the Direc-
tor of the United States Office of Technology Assessment:
Today there are over 1,000 small- to medium-sized biotech-
nology firms developing or manufacturing pharmaceuticals
for human use, of which about 200 are public companies.
Financial capital continues to be invested in the industry at
a fast pace: in fiscal years 1992 and 1993, more than $11.5
billion of new external capital financing was raised by bio-
technology firms.8
While research in biotechnology is now conducted all around the
world, the United States is considered to be the preeminent site of
5. 2 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 7.01, at 7-2.
6. 2 MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TE-CNOLOGY 648 (7th ed. 1992). See
also JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., RECOMBINANT DNA 453 (2d ed. 1992). A full discussion of
the concepts of molecular biology and recombinant DNA technology are beyond the scope
of this article. However, in the text of this article, certain concepts which are necessary
to understand the legal discussion will be explained. For a fuller understanding of bio-
technology, the reader is referred to any recent textbook in the field of molecular biology,
including the above-referenced text by Dr. Watson. A simplified discussion of the impor-
tant points of biotechnology can also be found in in re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 895-99
(Fed. Cir. 1988). See also 2 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 5.04[6][i], at 5-476 to -486.
7. OTA Testimony/Statement of Roger C. Herdman, Director, Office of Technology
Assessment, The Biotechnology Industry, Testimony Before the Joint Economic Committee,
June 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fed. News Serv. File [hereinafter
Herdman, OTA Testimony/Statement].
8. Id. (citations omitted). 'These figures do not include in-house biotechnology
research and development (R&D) conducted by large pharmaceutical firms." Id. See
also WATSON, supra note 6, at 468.
1994]
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biotechnology research and manufacture.9 Consequently, as tech-
nology has developed, the number of patent applications filed in
the United States in the field of biotechnology has soared.' °
This article reviews the key issues in enablement cases involv-
ing biotechnology inventions. Part I explores the purpose of the
enablement requirement and its application in both patent prosecu-
tion and patent litigation. Part II discusses common legal issues
that arise in enablement cases. Part III examines the recent U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit case In re Goodman."1
Part IV considers the scope of the enablement requirement in bio-
technology cases after In re Goodman. This Article concludes that
the enablement requirement is needed to prevent persons from
obtaining patent protection in the field of biotechnology for com-
pounds or processes that have not yet been discovered or fully
understood.
I. PURPOSE AND APPLICATION OF ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENT
The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 states that the patent
specification must provide "a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
... to make and use the same," and must "set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention."'12 The
"written description" and "best mode" elements of section 112 have
been interpreted as requirements that are separate from the
enablement requirement.' 3
9. Herdman, OTA Testimony/Statement, supra note 7
10. The number of patent applications in the field of biotechnology before the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office has increased from approximately 7,300 filed per year in
1987 to 13,300 filed per year in 1993. Eliot Marshall, Biotech Leaders Give Patent Office
a Litany of Complaints, SCIENCE, Oct. 28, 1994, at 537.
11. 11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
13. See, e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In Fiers, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that an application for "DNA which
codes for a human fibroblast interferon-beta polypeptide" did not comply with 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 on the grounds that the specification did not contain a "written description" of the
subject matter of the claim. Id. at 1170-71. The court added that "[iun light of our
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It is imperative in patent law that the disclosure of the patent
or patent application satisfies the enablement requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112. Failure to satisfy the enablement requirement is
grounds for the rejection of a patent application or for the invalida-
tion of a patent.
A. The Purpose of the Enablement Requirement
The requirement of an adequate disclosure (also called an en-
abling disclosure) is based in part on the rule that an inventor is
entitled to priority of invention, or the rights to the invention under
the patent laws, from the date of invention.14 In order to satisfy the
patent laws, the invention must be "reduced to practice."' 5 There
are two types of reduction to practice recognized in patent law.
First, there is actual reduction to practice, in which the inventor
makes or produces the invention. 16 The second type is constructive
reduction to practice, which is obtained when a patent application
for the invention is filed, provided that the application satisfies the
disposition of the written description requirement question, we do not address whether
... [the] application satisfies the enablement requirement." Id. at 1171 n.12. See
ROSENBERG, supra note I, § 13.04[5], at 13-33. See also Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935
F.2d 1555, 1560-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reviewing case law on the "written description"
requirement in order to clarify the law of the Federal Circuit in this area).
14. See 3 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 10.01, at 10-4.
15.' Id. § 10.03[1], at 10-21 ("the first to reduce the subject matter in question to
practice---either actually or constructively-is the first inventor"). There is an exception
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), however, which provides in part:
In determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the
respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but
also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to re-
duce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988).
Under the statute, "[t]he first to conceive the subject matter in question is the first
inventor provided he exercises reasonable diligence in reducing to practice from a time
just prior to when the first person to reduce to practice enters the field." 3 CHISUM, supra
note 2, § 10.03[I], at 10-21.
16. See, e.g., Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("To establish
reduction to practice of a chemical composition, it is sufficient to prove 'that the inventor
actually prepared the composition and knew it would work."' (quoting Mikus v. Wachtel
[II], 542 F.2d 1157, 1159 (C.C.P.A. 1976))).
1994]
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enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.17
Unless an inventor can prove invention at an earlier date, he or
she must rely on the filing date of the patent application as the date
for which priority of invention can be claimed. However, in order
to obtain the benefit of a filing date, the disclosure as filed must be
enabling as to the claims of the ,invention. Any reference cited
against the application in an effort to invalidate the patent, such as
a printed publication,18 an incident of public use or sale, 19 another
United States patent application, ° or a foreign patent application,21
must be measured against the filing date.
There are several circumstances under which an application can
be entitled to the filing date of a prior related application. Howev-
er, each of these situations requires that the prior application be
enabling for the subject matter of the new application. Thus, the
enablement requirement ensures that the benefit of an earlier filing
date is only obtained in cases where the invention was fully dis-
closed as of the earlier date.
For example, a continuation application is, in simple terms, "a
second application for the same invention claimed in a prior appli-
cation and filed before the original becomes abandoned. 22  By
17. See, e.g., Boyce v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1971).
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1988). An applicant is not entitled to a patent on
an invention patented or described in a printed publication in the United States or in a
foreign country (1) before the applicant's invention, or (2) more than one year prior to
the applicant's filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). An applicant is not entitled to a patent on an inven-
tion in public use or on sale in the United States more than one year prior to the filing
date. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1988). An applicant is not entitled to a patent on an inven-
tion described in a patent granted on an application for a patent filed by another person
in the United States before the applicant's invention, or by an international patent applica-
tion filed pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 371 (1988). 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (1988). An applicant is not entitled to a patent on an inven-
tion which was filed by the applicant, or the applicant's representative or assignee, on a
foreign application more than one year prior to filing in the United States. 35 U.S.C. §
102(d).
22. 2 ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 15.02[3][a], at 15-49 (citing MPEP, supra note
3, § 201.07). See also Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551,
555 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing continuation applications).
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definition the continuation application is for the same invention as
that disclosed in the first or original application; therefore, a con-
tinuation application is entitled to the same filing date as the origi-
nal application.23
Another example is a divisional application, which is "one
carved out of an earlier application, which disclosed and claimed
more than one independent invention, the result being that the divi-
sional application claims only one or more, but not all, of the inde-
pendent inventions of the earlier application. 24  It is filed in re-
sponse to a restriction requirement by the Examiner, in which the
Examiner determines that two or more independent and distinct
inventions are claimed in one application, and restricts the inventor
to a single invention .2  Under 35 U.S.C. § 121, "[i]f the other
invention is made the subject of a divisional application which
complies with the requirements of section 120 of this title it shall
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1988), which provides as follows:
An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by
the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in an application previously filed
in the United States, or as provided by section 363 of this title, which is filed
by an inventor or inventors named in the previously filed application shall have
the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the prior
application, if filed before the patenting or abandonment of or termination of
proceedings on the first application or on an application similarly entitled to the
benefit of the filing date of the first application and if it contains or is amended
to contain a specific reference to the earlier filed application.
35 U.S.C. § 120.
In contrast to the continuation application, the continuation-in-part application "is an
application filed during the lifetime of an earlier application by the same applicant,
repeating some substantial portion or all of the earlier application and adding matter not
disclosed in the earlier case." 2 ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 15.02[3][b], at 15-54 (citing
MPEP, supra note 3, § 201.08). The continuation-in-part application, or "CIP applica-
tion," "enjoys the benefit of the filing date of the parent application from which it is
derived only with respect to subject matter adequately disclosed in the earlier, supporting
application." Id. However, the Patent Office will generally treat a CIP application as
entitled to the filing date of its parent application unless, because of a cited reference or
an interference proceeding, it becomes necessary to determine the, actual date of disclo-
sure of the particular subject matter sought to be patented. See MPEP, supra note 3, §
201.08.
24. Transco, 38 F.3d at 555. See also 2 ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 15.02[3][c],
at 15-56 (describing elements of divisional applications).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (1988).
1994]
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be entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the original applica-
tion."26
Similarly, for an applicant who claims a filing date of a prior
foreign application under 35 U.S.C. § 11927 to obtain priority, the
application filed in the foreign country must be enabling under 35
U.S.C. § 112.28
B. Enablement in Patent Prosecution
Patent prosecution is the process by which an applicant obtains
patent protection.29 The first step in obtaining patent protection is
the filing of a patent application. 30  Thereafter, the application is
assigned to an examining group based on its subject matter.3' The
examination includes a search of the prior art relating to the subject
matter of the invention.32
The Examiner has the discretion to reject any of the claims of
the application. 33 If the Examiner does so, the applicant may re-
26. Id. The relevant test of 35 U.S.C. § 120 is contained supra, note 23. See also
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.141, 1.142 (1993). The restriction requirement is the subject of an entire
chapter in the MPEP, supra note 3, ch. 800.
27. 35 U.S.C. § 119 (1988) provides in part:
An application for patent for an invention filed in this country by any person
who has, or whose legal representatives or assigns have, previously regularly
filed an application for a patent for the same invention in a foreign country
which affords similar privileges in the case of applications filed in the United
States or to citizens of the United States, shall have the same effect as the same
application would have if filed in this country on the date on which the applica-
tion for patent for the same invention was first filed in such foreign country, if
the application in this country is filed within twelve months from the earliest
date on which such foreign application was filed; but no patent shall be granted
on any application for patent for an invention which had been patented or
described in a printed publication in any country more than one year before the
date of the actual filing of the application in this country, or which had been in
public use or on sale in this country more than one year prior to such filing.
35 U.S.C. § 119.
28. See Freerksen v. Gass, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 2007, 2008 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1991).
29. See generally 3 CHISUM, supra note 2, ch. 11.
30. Id. § 11.02, at 11-6.
31. Id. § 11.03, at 11-49 to -55. See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (1993).
32. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (1993).
33. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.106 (1993).
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spond to the Examiner's action by amending or dropping claims,
amending the specification, or presenting arguments in response to
the Examiner's decision.34 The Examiner will then allow the
claims of the invention, thereby letting the applicant obtain a pat-
ent, or "the process of action and response continues until the Ex-
aminer indicates that the rejection is final. 35 After a final action
has been issued by an Examiner, the amendments that the applicant
can make are limited.36 An applicant may appeal a final rejection
to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.37
The enablement requirement arises in the first step of patent
prosecution. To obtain a filing date for a patent application, the
inventor must file with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office a
specification which satisfies the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.71,38
contains at least one patent claim, and contains any drawings which
are necessary to understand the invention. The filing must be made
in the name of the inventor or inventors.39
Once the specification containing its disclosure has been filed
and the filing date has been obtained, new matter may not be intro-
duced into the application. This requirement is clearly set forth in
37 C.F.R. § 1.118(a), which provides:
No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclo-
sure of an application after the filing date of the application
(§ 1.53(b)). All amendments to the specification, including
the claims, and the drawings filed after the filing date of the
application must conform to at least one of them as it was
at the time of the filing of the application. Matter not
found in either, involving a departure from or an addition
34. 3 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 11.03[2], at 11-55 to -58. See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.111
(1993).
35. Id. § 11.03[2], at 11-68.
36. See id. § 11.03[2][c], at 11-68 to -69. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.116 (1993). Amend-
ments after final rejection "may be admitted upon a showing of good and sufficient
reasons why they are necessary and were not earlier presented." Id. § 1. 1 16(b). Howev-
er, amendments are discretionary, rather than as of right, in appealed cases. Id. §
1.116(c).
37. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.191 (1993).
38. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
39. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (1993).
19941
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to the original disclosure, cannot be added to the application
after its filing date even though supported by an oath or
declaration in accordance with § 1.63 or § 1.67 filed after
the filing date of the application.4 °
While the specification section is intended to set forth the full dis-
closure of the invention, the Examiner must view the entire patent
application as constituting the full disclosure. Thus, the Examiner
must also consider the drawings, abstracts, and claims as originally
filed in order to determine the, extent of the disclosure.4'
An Examiner may reject a claim based on the insufficiency of
the disclosure in the specification. There 'are primarily three types
of circumstances that would warrant a rejection based on the lack
of disclosure: (1) the claim is not supported by the disclosure in
the specification or contains statements that conflict with statements
made in the specification; 42 (2) an amended claim introduces "new
matter" that was not part of the original disclosure;4 3 or (3) the
claim seeks coverage that is unduly broad in light of the disclosure
or specification."4
40. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.118(a) (1993). The regulation carries out the rule of 35 U.S.C.
§ 132, which provides in pertinent part that "[n]o amendment shall introduce new matter
into the disclosure of the invention." 37 C.F.R. § 1.118(a).
41. See MPEP, supra note 3, § 608.04. "In establishing a disclosure applicant may
rely not only on the specification and drawing as filed but also on the original claims if
their content justifies it." Id.
42. See MPEP, supra note 3, § 706.03(n). Section 706.03(n) notes further that: "It
must be kept in mind that an original claim is part of the disclosure and might adequately
set forth subject matter which is completely absent from the specification. Applicant is
required in such an instance to add the subject matter to the specification." The MPEP
goes on to specifically point out that "[i]n chemical cases, a claim may be so broad as to
not be supported by the disclosure, in which case it is rejected as unwarranted by the
disclosure." Id.
43. See id. § 706.03(o). Section 706.03(o) specifically provides that "[n]ew matter
includes not only the addition of wholly unsupported subject matter, but also, adding
specific percentages or compounds after a broader original disclosure, or even the omis-
sion of a step from a method." Id.
44. See id. § 706.03(z). Section 706.03(z) provides that in certain arts, "where results
are predictable, broad claims may properly be supported by the disclosure of a single
species .. " (citation omitted). The section adds that in certain other arts where results
are not predictable, the disclosure of a single species will not provide support for more
generic claims. Section 706.03(z) specifically notes that "in arts such as chemistry it is
[Vol. 5:1
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C. Enablement in Patent Litigation
Patents have been described as "an invitation to a lawsuit. 45
Lawsuits alleging patent infringement are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts.46 In addition, there are also a
number of cases in which an alleged patent infringer sues in federal
court for a declaratory judgment that the patent at issue is invalid.47
These cases are brought under the federal declaratory judgment act
and are therefore subject to federal jurisdiction.48
The federal jurisdiction over patents does not extend to cases
"which do not directly call into question the scope or integrity of
a United States patent., 49 Such lawsuits, which can involve patent
license agreements, employment contracts related to patents, and
the testamentary disposition of patent rights, are usually subject to
state jurisdiction. °
In patent litigation, the issue of whether there is an adequate
disclosure arises when a party seeks to invalidate claims of an
issued patent on the basis that the patent specification does not
support the claims. Typically, the patent invalidity argument is
raised as a defense in a lawsuit alleging patent infringement.51
not obvious from the disclosure of one species, what other species will work." Id. (citing
In re Dreshfield, C.D. 351, 518 O.G. 255 (1940)). A rejection on the grounds that a
claim is "unduly broad" is a common rejection in biotechnology cases. See SaraLynn
Mandel, Biotechnology Patent Applications, in HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION
§ 14.5.1, at 14-26 to -28 (Jeffrey G. Sheldon ed., 1993).
45. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 17.00, at 17-3.
46. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1988).
47. See ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 17.03, at 17-38.
48. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
49. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 17.00, at 17-4.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., New England Med. Ctr. Hosps., Inc. v. PeproTech, Inc., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1852 (D.N.J. 1993). The statutory basis for raising this defense is 35 U.S.C. §
282, which provides in pertinent part:
The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or infringe-
ment of a patent and shall be pleaded:
(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part
II of this title as a condition for patentability ....
35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988).
19941
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However, in asserting this argument, a party must overcome the
presumption of validity that attaches to issued patents. 2
II. COMMON LEGAL ISSUES IN ENABLEMENT CASES
The issue of whether a patent or patent application satisfies the
enablement requirement is often raised in the courts. Whether the
question arises on appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Inter-
ferences (the "Board")5 3 or to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC")'54 or as a defense to a patent
infringement lawsuit,55 there are several issues that are common to
these cases. These include the following:
(1) the extent of the knowledge of a "person skilled in
the art;"
(2) whether there is sufficient disclosure of how the
invention is made;
(3) whether there is sufficient disclosure of how the
invention is used;
(4) the relevant date for determining whether the disclo-
sure is enabling; and
(5) when the disclosure is not enabling because as writ-
ten it requires "undue experimentation" in order to
make or use the invention. 6
52. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988).
53. Once an Examiner has finally rejected a claim or claims from an application, the
applicant may appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the "Board"). See
35 U.S.C. § 134 (1988). In its decision, the Board may affirm or reverse the decision of
the Examiner in whole or in part, or it may remand to the Examiner for further consid-
eration. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.196 (1993). See generally 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.191-1.198 (1993)
for the regulations governing practice before the Board.
54. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit hears appeals of decisions by the
Board. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.301 (1993).
55. See 2 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 7.03[8][b].
56. In an effort to present the legal issues of enablement in an organized manner, this
article has identified the key issues that arise in enablement questions and will discuss
each separately. As a general rule, however, cases on enablement simultaneously address
more than one of these issues.
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A. Person Skilled in the Art
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the determination of whether a disclo-
sure in a patent or patent application is enabling must be made
from the point of view of a person "skilled in the art."'  The level
of knowledge of a person skilled in the art to which the invention
or subject matter pertains is a fact-based question, and is necessari-
ly dependent on the particular art. There are several general rules
that can be applied to the issue regardless of the art, and that are
therefore relevant to biotechnology cases.
Generally, a "person skilled in the art" under § 112 is not pre-
sumed to know all prior art in the field.58 However, in preparing
a specification that satisfies the enablement requirement, it is com-
mon practice to incorporate by reference certain prior art material,
such as patents or scientific texts, 59 because this material is pre-
sumed to be known by a person skilled in the art. Any such refer-
ences cited by the applicant should be readily accessible to the
public.
57. It is important to note that the knowledge of a person skilled in the art is also
relevant to the determination that a patent or patent application is not obvious. 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1988). Essentially, § 103 provides that one cannot obtain a patent on subject
matter that is obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. However, the language of
the § 112, first paragraph, enablement requirement is different from the language of §
103, the "non-obviousness" statute, which requires courts to inquire into the state of
knowledge of "a person having ordinary skill in the art to which [the] subject matter
pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (emphasis added). As explained by Professor Chisum, there
is a distinction between these two fictional persons:
Section 103 directs the person with ordinary skill in the art to consider the
differences between the subject sought to be patented and the prior
art-meaning all the prior art. The policy behind this conclusive presumption
is to discourage wasteful or duplicative inventive activity by imposing an abso-
lute duty to research the entire pertinent prior art for a solution to a problem at
hand. Section 112 contains no reference to the prior art as such. The policy
behind § 112 is to make a patented invention fully available to the public with-
out any requirement of such arduous research.
2 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 7.03[2], at 7-27.
58. See 2 CHISUm, supra note 2, § 7.03[2][b], at 7-27. This is partly based on the
difference in policy behind the enablement requirement and the nonobviousness statute.
59. See MPEP, supra note 3, § 608.01(p), cmt. B.
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In the case In re Howarth,6 ° the applicant appealed from the
Examiner's rejection of all the claims in the application because of
lack of enablement. The Examiner asserted that the application,
which was for various derivatives of clavulanic acid, did not dis-
close the method of making the acid.6"
On appeal before the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the
predecessor to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,62 the
applicant asserted that the manner of making clavulanic acid was
disclosed in published patent specifications in Rhodesia, Panama
and Luxembourg. 63 The applicant argued that those skilled in the
art are presumed to know all prior art in United States and foreign
patents. 64 The court rejected the applicant's argument, and af-
firmed the rejection of the application's claims.65 It reasoned that
"[tjo supplement a specification which on its face appears deficient
under § 112, evidence must establish that the information which
must be read into the specification to' make it complete is known
to those having'ordinary skill in the art. The court went on to
conclude:
[N]othing in appellant's U.S. specification narrows the
search to Rhodesia, Panama, or Luxembourg, and even had
that much help been provided, no research aid has been
shown to exist to lead one to particular documents. Appel-
lant's personal knowledge of the existence of these com-
monly owned applications, and the information contained
therein, cannot be imputed to others. Therefore, we do not
see any basis for concluding that the source of information
for the production of clavulanic acid is so likely to be with-
in the knowledge of persons skilled in the art that appellant
60. 654 F.2d 103 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
61. See infra part ll.B. for a more detailed discussion of the case law involving
disclosure of the manner of making the invention.
62. See 3 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 11.06 [3][b], at 11-177 to -190.
63. Howarth, 654 F.2d at 104. The particular publications that applicant referred to
in the argument were not referenced in the application. Id.
64. Id. at 105.
65. Id. at 106-07.
66. Id. at 106.
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need say nothing about this essential part of practicing his
invention in his application.67
It is important to note that the relevant inquiry is to the level
of knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art, and not to
that of an expert. A Federal Circuit case illustrating this rule is In
re Buchner.68 In Buchner, the CAFC affirmed the Board's rejec-
tion of an application on the grounds that the disclosure was not
enabling, and discounted the applicant's affidavit of an expert who
swore the application was enabling.69 The CAFC commented that
enablement "requires that, unless the information is well known in
the art, the application itself must contain this information; it is not
sufficient to provide it only through an expert's declaration. 70
B. Manner of Making the Invention
Part of the enablement requirement of § 112 is a description of
the manner of "making" the invention. 7' While the inventor need
not describe the particular circumstances under which the invention
was first made, the inventor must teach a person of skill in the art
how to make or obtain the invention.72 In cases involving biotech-
67. Id. at 107.
68. 929 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
69. id. at 660-6i.
70. id. at 661. The CAFC also'commented about the expert's affidavit: "He did not
provide adequate support for his conclusion. What he did describe was how he would
construct the [structure at issue], but he did not demonstrate that such construction was
well-known to those of ordinary skill in the art." Id.
71. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). See supra note 3 and accompanying text for the
language of § 112.
72. In In re Breslow, 616 F.2d 516, 519 (C.C.P.A. 1980), the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals commented on the applicant's duty to disclose the manner of making the
invention, a chemical compound:
[W]e interpret the enablement clause of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. [§] 112
as requiring that the claimed invention, i.e. the claimed compounds per se
which constitute the invention at issue, must be taught in a manner such that the
artisan will be in possession of the claimed invention. Appellant, however, does
not disclose how this may be achieved nor, in fact, does he even assert that
such may necessarily be possible. He only postulates that using very sophisti-
cated techniques someone may one day possibly isolate and analyze the instant
compounds. It is urged by him that iivestigations of this nature are unneces-
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nology inventions, the manner of making the invention is compli-
cated by the fact that the process may require the use of a particu-
lar microorganism as a starting material.73 In such a case,
enablement is met when a sample of the microorganism is deposit-
ed with an independent cell depository. The deposit may be made
after the filing date of the application, provided that the material is
deposited in a suitable depository before the patent is granted.74
Generally, the depository must assure "permanence of the deposit
and ready accessibility thereto by the public if a patent is grant-
ed. '75 According to the applicable regulations: the depository is
entitled to review the material; the depository must be referred to
in the specification by name and address; the deposit number must
be provided; and the applicant must aver under oath that a sample
of the material will be maintained in the depository.76
sary for the purpose of this invention. We disagree. The invention at bar, as
defined by the appealed claims, is the compounds, per se, and as long as appel-
lant has failed to give directions to one skilled in the art which would put him
into possession of the invention so claimed, he has not satisfied the enablement
clause of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
Id.
73. See 2 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 7.03[5][b], at 7-60. See also Kiyoshi Nakayama,
Sources of Industrial Microorganisms, in I BIOTECHNOLOGY 357 (1981).
74. See In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1220-22 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In Lundak, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that "35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, does
not require the transfer of a sample of the invention to an independent depository prior
to the filing date of the patent application." Id. at 1222. The court reasoned that main-
taining a sample of the material during the application process so that the PTO could have
access, and filing a sample with a depository prior to the issuance of the patent, complies
with the statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 112 and 114. Id. 35 U.S.C. § 114
provides that "[tihe Commissioner may require the applicant to furnish a model of conve-
nient size to exhibit advantageously the several parts of his invention. When the inven-
tion is a composition of matter, the Commissioner may require the applicant to furnish
specimens or ingredients for the purpose of inspection or experiment." 35 U.S.C. § 114
(1988).
75. MPEP, supra note 3, § 608.01(p)C.
76. See id. The regulations governing the deposit of biological materials are found
at 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801 to 1.825 (1993). See also Volker Vossius, Patent Protection for
Biological Inventions, in 1 BIOTECHNOLOGY 446-49 (1981) (discussing depositing of
microorganisms).
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The deposit requirement was explored in Ex parte Hildebrand,
a case in which the Board addressed the language of section
608.01(p)C of the MPEP, which requires that "all restrictions on
the availability to the public of the cultures so deposited will be
irrevocably removed upon the granting of the patent. 7 1 In
Hildebrand, the applicant deposited a sample of the particular
strains of a microorganism necessary to produce the invention with
a depository under the Budapest Treaty on the International Recog-
nition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purpose of Patent
Procedure.79 The Treaty provides for the deposit of a microorgan-
ism with a depository that will hold its existence in secret.80 The
CAFC affirmed the Examiner's rejection of the claims under 35
U.S.C. § 112, reasoning that the deposit under the Budapest Treaty
did not comply with MPEP section 608.01 (p)C.8 1
On the other hand, in In re Wands,8 2 the enablement require-
ment was satisfied in part by the deposit of a microorganism sam-
ple. Wands involved an appeal from a decision of the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences sustaining a rejection of all the
claims in an application for an immunoassay method for detecting
certain hepatitis antigens. 3 For the purposes of complying with §
112, the applicant had deposited a sample of the cell line that was
part of the invention with a recognized cell depository. 4
On appeal, the CAFC addressed the question of whether the
Board erred, as a matter of law, by sustaining the Examiner's rejec-
tion for lack of enablement under § 112.85 The CAFC held that the
77. 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1990).
78. Id. at 1663 (quoting MPEP, supra note 3, § 608.01(p)C).
79. See id. at 1663 n.2; see also Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition
of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, Apr. 28, 1977,
32 U.S.T. 1241 [hereinafter Treaty].
80. Rule 9.2 of the Treaty provided in part that a depository "shall not give any
information to anyone concerning any microorganism deposited with it under the treaty
except to an authority, natural person or legal entity which is entitled to obtain a sample
.... .15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664 (quoting Treaty, supra note 79).
81. Id.
82. 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
83. Id. at 733.
84. See id. at 734.
85. Id. at 733. Decisions of the Board on enablement are reviewed as a question of
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written specification was, in fact, enabling. 6 However, in dicta the
court commented at length on the method of obtaining enablement
by the deposit of a sample. 7 The CAFC noted that "[a] deposit
has been held necessary for enablement where the starting materials
(i.e., the living cells used to practice the invention, or cells from
which the required cells can be produced) are not readily available
to the public. 88
law by the CAFC. See id. at 735 (citing Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793
F.2d 1261, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987)).
86. Id. at 740.
87. Id. at 735-36.
88. Id. at 735 (citing In re Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. 804, 807-08 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1982)). A more complete text of the CAFC's statements are as follows:
Where an invention depends on the use of living materials such as microorgan-
isms or cultured cells, it may be impossible to enable the public to make the
invention (i.e., to obtain these living materials) solely by means of a written
disclosure. One means that has been developed for complying with the
enablement requirement is to deposit the living materials in cell depositories
which will distribute samples to the public who wish to practice the invention
after the patent issues. Administrative guidelines and judicial decisions have
clarified the conditions under which a deposit of organisms can satisfy the
requirements of section 112. A deposit has been held necessary for enablement
where the starting materials (i.e., the living cells used to practice the invention,
or cells from which the required cells can be produced) are not readily available
to the public. Even when starting materials are available, a deposit has been
necessary where it would require undue experimentation to make the cells of
the invention from the starting materials.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
With regard to patent protection of biotechnological inventions throughout the world,
it has been stated:
It is not sufficient to describe a microbiological invention in terms of words,
drawings and formulae if the invention makes use of a microorganism or virus
which cannot readily be located, isolated or produced again. Where inventions
of this type are concerned, disclosure at the filing date can only be considered
adequate if: (1) the microorganism or virus has been deposited with a suitable
depository for an adequate period of time; (2) the depository has been irrevoca-
bly authorized to issue propagable samples to the patent granting authorities at
any time and to third parties subsequent to initial publication; (3) after initial
publication[,] the depositor no longer has any power of disposition over the
deposited microorganism or virus; (4) the depository has demonstrated its will-
ingness to proceed in accordance with the declaration of release; (5) third par-
ties can, on reasonable conditions, obtain propagable samples of the deposited
microorganisms or viruses.
Vossius, supra note 76, at 446.
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C. Manner of Using the Invention
The enablement requirement of § 112, first paragraph, also
requires that the patent or patent application contain a description
of the manner of using the invention.8 9 An illustrative case in the
field of chemistry is In re Gardner.90 In Gardner, the applicant
appealed from a decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals,
the predecessor of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences,
that rejected claims 1-5 of the application, in part, on the grounds
that the application was not enabling as to the use of the inven-
tion.9' The invention at issue was the purported discovery of the
antidepressant activity in 2-aminomethyl-1, 3-benzodioxole com-
pounds.92
On appeal, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA")
affirmed the rejection of the claims by the Board of Patent Ap-
peals. The court reviewed the specification and concluded that it
was inadequate because it did not disclose how to use the drugs.93
The court noted that the specification gave a range of daily dosages
from 10 mg. to 450 mg. for the proper use of the drug. The appli-
cation, however, did not disclose "at what point in the process of
administering to a patient, say a 10 mg. capsule, an anti-depressant
effect may be expected in the course. of proceeding at some un-
specified intervals toward the possible 45th capsule for the day. 94
The court also noted that the specification failed to disclose a host
on whom the compound was to be used, although it stated that this
alone did not render the claims indefinite.
89. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). See supra note 3 and accompanying text for the
language of § 112.
90. 427 F.2d 786 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
91. Id. at 787.
92. Id. at 786.
93. Id. at 787.
94. Id. at 789.
95. See id. at 787-88. The MPEP has "Guidelines for Considering Disclosures of
Utility in Drug Cases." See MPEP, supra note 3, § 608.01(p), cmt. A. The guidelines
state that "[i]t is not necessary to specify the dosage or method of use if it is obvious to
one skilled in the art that such information could be obtained without undue experimenta-
tion." Id.
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More recently, in In re Ziegler,96 the CAFC ruled that
the "how to use" prong of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, incor-
porates the statutory requirement of utility provided in 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, 97 and that if an application fails to satisfy the standards of
§ 101 then as a matter of law it is not enabling under § 112.98 The
Court further stated that "[it is axiomatic that an invention cannot
be considered 'useful' in the sense that a patent can be granted on
it, unless substantial or practical utility for the invention has been
discovered and disclosed where such utility would not be obvi-
ous."
99
A recent discussion of this principle in the field of biotechnolo-
gy can be found in Ex parte Aggarwal.1°° In Aggarwal, the Board
affirmed the Examiner's rejection of certain claims for the treat-
ment of tumors in animals by use of a cytotoxic protein known as
lymphotoxin.' 0 An illustrative claim in that case was claim 57,
which reads as follows:
A method for the treatment of tumors comprising adminis-
tering to an animal in a physiologically innocuous dosage
form a therapeutically effective amount of a cytotoxic
lymphotoxin as a product of expression in a recombinant
host cell selected from the group of cells from multicellular
organisms, eukaryotic microbes and prokaryotes.' °2
The Board found that the specification contained "many broad
statements regarding utility," but that "the actual exemplification of
96. 992 F.2d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
97. Id. at 1200. Section 101 provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
98. See Ziegler, 992 F.2d at 1201.
99. Id. (quoting Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). It should
be noted that rejections for lack of utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 "are fairly common for
biotechnology inventions." Mandel, supra note 44, § 14.3.2.2., at 14-9. One reason for
the number of § 101 rejections is the claiming of compounds, such as pharmaceuticals,
for the treatment of humans where human testing has not yet occurred. See id.
100. 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992).
101. Id. at 1339.
102. id. at 1335.
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utility is sparse."'10 3 The Board noted that examples 4 and 5 of the
specification covered a single use, namely activity in tumor necro-
sis assay with mice as the host. °4 The Board then reviewed the
prior art, and concluded that it raised doubts about the practical
utility of lymphotoxin when used against tumors in humans.l0 5 In
affirming the rejection, the Board noted that "[t]he [E]xaminer had
more than adequate reason to doubt the objective truth of the broad
statement of utility set forth in appellants' specification.""'1
Rejection of an application for a biotechnology invention either
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, on the grounds of lack of
utility, or under 35 U.S.C. § 101, on the grounds of the lack of
testing of a compound in humans, is a source of much concern in
the biotechnology industry.'17 In response to these concerns it
appears that the Patent and Trademark Office will ease its practice
of rejecting biotechnology patents for lack of utility.108
D. Relevant Date for Determining Enablement
Courts have consistently held that enablement must be consid-
ered in light of the state of the art as it exists on the date of fil-
ing.'09 For example, in the biotechnology field, the CAFC in In re
Wright.. heard an appeal from a decision of the Board which re-
jected certain claims of an application directed to producing live,
103. Id. at 1337-38.
104. Id. at 1338.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 1339. A more complete discussion of recent cases in this area can be
found in Antoinette F. Konski, The Utility Rejection in Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical
Prosecution Practice, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 821 (1994).
107. Marshall, supra note 10, at 537; Biotech Industry Blasts PTO at San Diego
Hearing, 48 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 677, 678 (Oct. 20, 1994).
108. Robert Pear, U.S. Easing Rules on Biotech Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1994,
at B 11.
109. See, e.g., In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ("It is an appli-
cant's obligation to supply enabling disclosure without reliance on what others may
publish after he has filed .... If he cannot supply enabling information, he is not yet in
a position to file."). See also United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865
F.2d 1247, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (reaffirming this principle as enunciated in Glass).
110. 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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non-pathogenic vaccines against pathogenic RNA viruses."' The
claims were rejected on the grounds that the disclosure was not
enabling "because one of ordinary skill in the art would have had
to engage in undue experimentation in February of 1983 (the effec-
tive filing date of Wright's application) to practice the subject mat-
ter of these claims."''
12
The CAFC affirmed the Board's decision, noting that the claims
at issue covered "any and all live, non-pathogenic vaccines, and
processes for making such vaccines, which elicit immunoprotective
activity in any animal toward any RNA virus."' 13 The court further
noted that the specification contained only a single working exam-
ple of the invention. 1 4 Finally, referring to certain prior art articles
cited by Wright in the specification, the CAFC concluded:
Wright fails to point out with any particularity in this decla-
ration, or in his arguments to this court, how the listed doc-
uments evidence that a skilled artisan in February of 1983
would have been able to carry out, without undue experi-
mentation, the identification, isolation, cloning, recombina-
tion, and efficacy testing steps required to practice the full
scope of the appealed claims." 5
E. Standard of Undue Experimentation
Examiners or courts often find that the specification of a patent
or patent application sets forth the basics of the invention to a
person of ordinary skill in the art, but nevertheless requires a cer-
tain amount of experimentation for the invention to be practiced." 6
111. Id. at 1559.
112. Id. at 1560. The standard of "undue experimentation" is discussed infra part
II.E.
113. Id. at 1562.
114. Id. at 1559.
115. Id. at 1563. See also Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904
F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (vacating summary judgment order because the record before
the court did not establish the state of the art at the time that the application for the patent
was filed).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785-86 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Lever Bros. v. Procter & Gamble, 139 F.2d 633, 638-39 (4th Cir. 1943).
[Vol. 5:1
ENABLEMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY CASES
Where a certain amount of experimentation is required in order to
practice an invention, resolution of the issue of whether the disclo-
sure is enabling typically turns on the question of when the amount
of experimentation required by the disclosure becomes "undue" or
"unreasonable."' 17
The rationale for holding that a patent specification which re-
quires some experimentation is still enabling under the statute can
be found in In re Angstadt."8 In Angstadt, the patent application
at issue covered a method of using a catalyst to perform a desired
chemical reaction. The method of the invention required the use
of an organometallic complex having a certain formula as the cata-
lyst." 9 The formula, however, had variables so that a number of
chemical compounds could have fallen within its terms. 20
The specification of the application did not list all of the possi-
ble compounds, and the application was rejected by the Examiner
under § 112.121 The Examiner's decision was affirmed by the
Board. 22  The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, however,
reversed. 23 The court acknowledged that requiring a disclosure of
every catalyst that would work or would not work could force
applicants to disclose thousands of examples.2 4 According to the
court: "
[S]uch a requirement would force an inventor seeking ade-
quate patent protection to carry out a prohibitive number of
actual experiments. This would tend to discourage inven-
tors from filing patent applications in an unpredictable area
117. See ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 13.0415][b], at 13-49 to -50. The "undue
experimentation" cases discussed in this section comprise what is perhaps the most
important series of cases concerning enablement of biotechnological inventions. In re
Goodman also addresses the level of experimentation necessary for a biotechnology patent
application to be considered enabling.
118. 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
119. See id. at 499-500.
120. See id. at 499. The catalyst of the invention had the following formula:
MXn(HAPA)m. HAPA is one of several possible hexaalkylphosphoramide, MX is a metal
salt, m is an integer of from I to 8, and n is an integer of from 1 to 4. Id.
121. See id. at 500.
122. See id. at 500-01.
123. See id. at 502.
124. See id.
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since the patent claims would have to be limited to those
embodiments which are expressly disclosed.
1 25
The court concluded, however, that since the applicants had identi-
fied the catalysts and had detailed how to make and use them, "the
experimentation required to determine which catalysts will produce
hydroperoxides would not be undue and certainly would not 're-
quire ingenuity beyond that to be expected of one of ordinary skill
in the art. ' ' 126
The Board articulated the standard for determining what consti-
tutes "undue" experimentation in Ex parte Forman.127 In Forman,
the applicant appealed from the Examiner's decision rejecting
claims 1-33 of an application for an oral vaccine consisting of
genetically engineered hybrid bacteria on the grounds of an insuffi-
cient disclosure. 128 The Examiner found, in part, that the disclosure
required undue experimentation on the part of a person skilled in
the art to practice the invention. 29
The Board noted that to determine if the amount of experimen-
tation is "undue," one must apply a reasonableness standard, keep-
ing in mind the nature of the invention and the state of the art.
130
The Board noted that in some circumstances, a "considerable
amount of experimentation" is permitted if it is routine or if the
disclosure "provides a reasonable amount of guidance with respect
to the direction in which the experimentation should proceed to
enable the determination of how to practice a desired embodiment
of the invention claimed."' 3' The Board listed the following factors
to be considered when determining if experimentation is "undue":
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary;
(2) the amount of direction or guidance presented;
125. Id. at 502-03.
126. Id. at 503 (quoting Fields v. Conover, 443 F.2d 1386, 1390-91 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
127. 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1986).
128. Id. at 546-47.
129. See id. at 547.
130. Id. (citing Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972)).
131. Id.
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(3) the presence or absence of working samples;
(4) the nature of the invention;
(5) the state of the prior art;
(6) the relative skill of those in the art;
(7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art; and
(8) the breadth of the claims.'32
The Board's factors were expressly adopted by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit in the case In re Wands. 133
Along the same lines, in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical
Co., 34 the CAFC decided an appeal from a decision of the Massa-
chusetts District Court that ruled, in part, that claim 7 and certain
other claims dependent from claim 7 of the plaintiff's U.S. Patent
No. 4,703,008 ("the '008 patent") were not enabling. 135 The '008
patent covered "DNA Sequences Encoding Erythropoietin"
("EPO"). 136 Claim 7 of the '008 patent provided:
A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially
of a DNA sequence encoding a polypeptide having an ami-
no acid sequence sufficiently duplicative of that of erythro-
poietin to allow possession of the biological property of
causing bone marrow cells to increase production of
reticulocytes and red blood cells, and to increase hemoglo-
132. Id.
133. 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Wands court further commented on
the determination of what constitutes undue experimentation: "The test is not merely
quantitative, since a considerable amount of experimentation is permissible, if it is merely
routine, or if the specification in question provides a reasonable amount of guidance with
respect to the direction in which the experimentation should proceed." Id. (quoting In re
Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. 804, 807 (Bd. Pat App. & Int. 1982)). The Wands court explained
that although the term "undue experimentation" does not appear in the enablement statute,
"it is well established that enablement requires that the specification teach those in the art
to make and use the invention without undue experimentation." Id. (emphasis added). The
court explained that whether the amount of experimentation required is undue "is a
conclusion reached by weighing many factual considerations." The court then restated
the factors listed by the Board in Ex parte Forman. Id.
134. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen,
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
135. Id. at 1205.
136. Id. at 1203.
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bin synthesis or iron uptake. 137
The CAFC noted that claim 7 was a generic claim that covered
"all possible DNA sequences that will encode any polypeptide
having an amino acid sequence 'sufficiently duplicative' of EPO to
possess the property of increasing production of red'blood cells."
1 38
The CAFC, in considering whether the scope of the specification
of the '008 patent was commensurate with the scope of the claim,
quoted sections from the '008 specification in which the patentees
effectively claimed enablement for more than a million different
DNA sequences, all analogs of EPO.139
The CAFC, in affirming the district court's finding that there
was no enablement of claim 7, stated that for patents or patent
applications claiming DNA sequences, enablement "means disclos-
ing how to make and use enough sequences to justify grant of the
claims sought."' 4 The court further noted that the specification
contained little enabling disclosure of the particular analogs and
how to make them. 41  Thus, Amgen's disclosure was ultimately
found not to be enabling for claims drawn to all EPO gene analogs
because Amgen had only explained how to make and use a few of
137. Id. at 1204.
138. Id. at 1212.
139. See id. at 1213.
140. Id.
141. Id. The section quoted from the specification was the following:
[O]ne may readily design and manufacture genes coding for microbial expres-
sion of polypeptides having primary conformations which differ from that
herein specified for mature EPO in terms of the identity or location of one or
more residues (e.g., substitutions, terminal and intermediate additions and dele-
tions) ....
DNA sequences provided by the present invention are thus seen to comprehend
all DNA sequences suitable for use in securing expression in a procaryotic or
eucaryotic host cell of a polypeptide product having at least a part of the prima-
ry structural conformation and one or more of the biological properties of eryth-
ropoietin, and selected from among: (a) the DNA sequences set out in FIGS.
5 and 6; (b) DNA sequences which hybridize to the DNA sequences defined in
(a) or fragments thereof; and (c) DNA sequences which, but for the degeneracy
of the genetic code, would hybridize to the DNA sequences defined in (a) and
(b).
Id. at 1212-13 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008).
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the analogs.'42
A result similar to that in Amgen was reached by the CAFC in
In re Vaeck. 143 In Vaeck, the applicant appealed from a decision
of the PTO Board of Appeals rejecting certain claims of an appli-
cation for "Hybrid Genes Incorporating a DNA Fragment Contain-
ing a Gene Coding for an Insecticidal Protein, Plasmids, Trans-
formed Cyanobacteria Expressing Such Protein and Method for Use
as a Biocontrol Agent."' 44 The genes used in the invention were
derived from the bacillus genus. They were capable of being ex-
pressed in cyanobacteria cells, and provided for the production of
insecticidal proteins within the cyanobacteria. 45  One of the
grounds of the Board's rejection was lack of enablement. 146
The claims of the invention at issue in Vaeck covered preferred
142. Id. at 1213-14. The court summed up its conclusions on the enablement issue
of the '008 patent:
Considering the structural complexity of the EPO gene, the manifold possibili-
ties for change in its structure, with attendant uncertainty as to what utility will
be possessed by these analogs, we consider that more is needed concerning
identifying the various analogs that are within the scope of the claim, methods
for making them, and structural requirements for producing compounds with
EPO-like activity. It is not sufficient, having made the gene and a handful of
analogs whose activity has not been clearly ascertained, to claim all possible
genetic sequences that have EPO-like activity. Under the circumstances, we
find no error in the court's conclusion that the generic DNA sequence claims
are invalid under Section 112.
Id. at 1214.
The Amgen case also involved an enablement issue with regard to claims I and 3 of
U.S. Patent No. 4,677,195, owned by co-defendant Genetics Institute ("GI"). See id. at
1202. Claims 1 and 3 covered EPO having a specific activity of at least 160,000 IU/AU
(International Units/Absorbance Units) in vivo. See id. at 1215-16.
The CAFC found that the patent was not enabling for claims 1-3. The CAFC relied
on its findings that GI had no evidence that it had even prepared EPO with a specific
activity of 160,000 IU/AU in vivo, and also cited literature that cast doubt on whether an
EPO with this specific activity could be produced. See id. at 1216-17. The court's
holding was limited, as the court stated that "[wle do not hold that one must always prove
that a disclosed process operates effectively to produce a claimed product." Id. at 1217.
143. 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
144. See id. at 489-90.
145. See id. at 490.
146. See id. at 492-93. The claims were also rejected as obvious over the prior art
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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species of the gene, gene promoters and selectable markers (claims
1-15); a hybrid plasmid vector which included the preferred species
of claim 1 (claims 17-31); a bacterial strain (claim 32); a
cyanobacterium (claims 34-48); an insecticidal composition (claims
50-51); and a plasmid that had been deposited (claim 52).147 The
claims of the application were directed to the bacillus gene in ge-
neric terms. 48 The specification disclosed two bacillus species and
nine separate genera. as host cyanobacteria that would be within the
invention. 4 9 However, the examples contained in the specification
described the transformation of only a single strain of
cyanobacteria, cyanobacterium synechocystis 6803.150 Two differ-
ent promoters were also disclosed, both for synechocystis 6803.1'
On appeal, the applicant argued to the CAFC that the disclosure
in the application was enabling. The court first noted that, with the
exception of claims 47 and 48, all the claims rejected under § 112
were not restricted to any particular genus or species of
cyanobacteria.152 The court then considered the somewhat incom-
plete understanding of the biology of cyanobacteria at the time of
appellants' filing date, as well as the limited disclosure contained
in the specification. 53 The court affirmed the Board's rejection of
claims 1-46 and 50-51, noting that "[t]here is no reasonable corre-
lation between the narrow disclosure in appellants' specification
and the broad scope of protection sought in the claims encompass-
ing gene expression in any and all cyanobacteria."I 54
147. Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 490.
148. See id.
149. See id. In the classification of bacteria, a "species" is designated from an
investigation of a large number of strains of bacteria. A species is determined to have
features that are identical with those of other bacteria. A genus, of which the plural form
is genera, is a group of related species. See 2 MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY 8-9 (1977).
150. See In re vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 490 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
151. See id.
152. Id. at 495. Claim 47 limited the cyanobacterium of claim I to a
cyanobacterium from among the genera anacystis and synchechocystis, and claim 48




ENABLEMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY CASES
The CAFC in Vaeck cautioned, however, that its reasoning did
not suggest that patent applicants in "unpredictable" arts cannot
obtain claims covering a particular genus when the specification
only discloses a species of the genus. 55 Citing Angstadt, the court
assured applicants that they need not disclose every species encom-
passed by the claims. 56 The court went on to state:
[T]he disclosure must adequately guide the art worker to
determine, without undue experimentation, Which species
among all those encompassed by the claimed genus pc.3sess
the disclosed utility. Where, as here, a claimed genus rep-
resents a diverse and relatively poorly understood group of
microorganisms, the required level of disclosure will be
greater than, for example, the disclosure of an invention
involving a "predictable" factor such as a mechanical or
electrical element.
57
The CAFC reversed the Board's rejection of claims 47 and 48,
which were directed to the expression of the gene of claim- 1.158
The court found that the subject matter of claims 47 and 48 was
disclosed in the specification.1
59
1II. IN RE GOODMAN
With this background of case law on enablement in the context
of biotechnology inventions, the CAFC considered In re Goodman.
A. Background
In the case In re Goodman,6° the CAFC affirmed, on appeal,
the Board's rejection of all claims in an application by Goodman,
et al., for a method of manufacturing mammalian peptides in plant
155. See id. at 496.
156. Id. (citing In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1976)). See also supra notes




160. 11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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cells, on the basis of an inadequate disclosure. 16 1 The patent appli-
cation at issue in Goodman, U.S. Serial No. 07/507,380 ("the '380
application"), was a continuation application of a prior application
which issued as U.S. Patent No. 4,956,282 ("the '282 patent"). 162
Claims 1-13 of the '380 application were on appeal, and all of
them were directed to a method of manufacturing mammalian
peptides in plant cells. 1
63
The use of biotechnology or genetic engineering in plants is a
modern adaptation of the centuries-old practice of plant breeding. 164
Plant breeding grew out of the discovery that plants reproduce
sexually, and that the generation of plants is dependent upon polli-
nation (i.e., the introduction of pollen from a male part, a stamen,
to a female part, an ovule).,65 It requires the crossing of two plant
lines and the recording of characteristics over generations.166 In
addition, plant breeding involves the passing on of additional genes
other than the desired genes. 67
In contrast to plant breeding, modern methods of genetic engi-
neering in plants allow scientists to transfer specific desired genes
(e.g., resistance to a particular insect) and introduce these genes
into plants.1 68 Modern genetic engineering consequently allows for
faster results than plant breeding. 69
161. Id. at 1048. The practice of obtaining a particular gene for medical or industrial
use requires first cloning the gene, then incorporating the gene into a host cell for produc-
tion. The choice of the particular host cell "depends on the project goals and on, the
properties of the protein to be produced." WATSON, supra note 6, at 454.
162. Goodman, 11 F.3d at 1048. Since the '380 application was a continuation of a
prior application, it has the same specification of the prior application. See supra note
23 for the text of 35 U.S.C. § 120.
163. Goodman, 11 F.3d at 1048.
164. WATSON, supra note 6, at 273. See generally Charles F. Wimpee, Plant Bio-
technology, in 7b BIOTECHNOLOGY 333-47 (1989).
165. See WATSON, supra note 6. It is believed that the first instances of plant breed-
ing occurred in ancient Mesopotamia, after the discovery of pollination in date trees.
Wimpee, supra note 164, at 334. Date trees are one of the many kinds of trees that are
dioecious, i.e., they can be divided into separate male trees and female trees. See id.
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Generally, the method of the '380 application referred to in
Goodman is achieved by integrating the plant cells of a DNA con-
struct coding for a mammalian peptide, whereby the plant cell
transcribes the region of coding for the mammalian peptide and the
peptide is harvested. 70 The '380 application described a method
involving the introduction of the desired gene into the Ti plas-
mid. 7' The CAFC characterized the process as follows:
[U]pon insertion of a foreign DNA segment into the T-re-
gion of the Ti plasmid, the natural genetic transfer functions
of these bacteria introduce the foreign segment into the
plant cell genome. Using its own cell machinery, the plant
cell then dutifully strives to transcribe the T-DNA segment
and translate the peptide it encodes. Numerous factors af-
fect successful transcription and translation, including the
regulatory gene regions (i.e., initiation and termination se-
quences) preceding and following the T-DNA segment as
well as intracellular compounds present during protein for-
mation. If a stable translation product results, the peptide
can be harvested from the plant cells. 172
The claims of the '380 application were broad. For example,
claim 1 described:
1. A method for producing a mammalian peptide which
comprises: growing plant cells containing an integrated
sequence comprising, a first expression cassette having in
the direction of transcription (1) a transcriptional and
translational initiation region functional in said plant cells,
(2) a structural gene coding for said mammalian peptide,
and (3) a termination region, whereby said structural gene
is expressed to produce said mammalian peptide; and isolat-
ing said mammalian peptide substantially free of plant cell
170. See In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
171. See id. The plasmid of a cell is a type of minichromosome contained in a cell.
It is not linked to the main chromosome of the cell. Plasmids are often used for recombi-
nant DNA research. WATSON, supra note 6, at 27-28. The Ti plasmid is a particularly
large plasmid that is often used for research. See id. at 277.
172. Goodman, 11 F.3d at 1048.
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components. 173.
Claims 2-6 were dependent on claim 1, and all involved "methods
for producing mammalian peptides in plant cells using expression
cassettes with initiation codons recognized by plant cells."'174 Thus,
claims 1-6 attempted to encompass all mammalian peptide pro-
duced in any plant cell. 75 Although claims 2-6 added some limita-
tions to claim 1, they did not limit the type of mammalian peptide
or the type of plant cell.
Claim 7, which was an independent claim, claim 8, which de-
pended on claim 7, and claim 9, which depended on claim 8, all
recited the production of the peptide interferon in plant cells.'76
Claims 10-13 covered a nucleic acid construct to be used in the
method claims of the application.'77 Only claims 1-9 were relevant
for purposes of the enablement issue.
B. '282 Patent Disclosure
Since the '380 application was a continuation of the application
which resulted in the '282 patent, both the '380 application and the
'282 patent have the same disclosure. 178 The '282 patent was enti-
tled "Mammalian Peptide Expression in Plant Cells." In the sum-
mary of the invention, it was explained that "[e]fficient production
of physiologically active mammalian proteins is provided by intro-
ducing functional constructs containing the mammalian structural
gene into a plant cell."'179
173. Id.
174. Id. (footnote omitted).
175. Id. at 1049.
176. Id.
177. Id. As the CAFC explained, there is a close relationship between the claims
of the '380 application and the claims of its parent '282 patent. Id. at 1048-49. Claim
8 of the application is identical to claim 1 of the '282 patent except that the application
claim covers "plant cells" while the patent claim is limited to "dicotyledonous plant
cells." Id. at 1048. Claim 9 of the application broadens the language of claim I of the
issued patent in the same manner. Id. at 1049. Application claim 13 is identical to claim
3 of the patent except that the application claim covers "an interferon" while the patent
claim is limited to gamma-interferon. See id.
178. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
179. U.S. Patent No. 4,956,282, col. 1, lines 64-67.
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The '282 patent specification disclosed the advantages of grow-
ing mammalian peptides in plants rather than in unicellular organ-
isms, which are more economical to maintain. 180 The specification
stated that because of the difference in structure between mammali-
an cells and unicellular organisms, the mammalian protein does not
properly fold in the unicellular organism. For example, certain
mammalian peptides, such as enzymes, "may require folding and/or
processing that is unavailable in unicellular microorganisms."'' 8 1
According to the specification, mammalian proteins grown in
unicellular organisms are sometimes not able to obtain "a substan-
tial proportion or all of the physiological activity of the naturally
occurring peptide obtained from a native host.' 182 The specification
further disclosed that, the growth of peptides in plants that are in-
tended to be administered physiologically "diminishes the probabil-
ity of contaminants causing an adverse response upon administra-
tion to a mammalian host."' 183
With respect to the transfer of the DNA construct into the plant
cell, the specification stated that transfer could be effected by way
of "infection A. tumefaciens or A. rhizogenes, microinjection,
liposome fusion, viral infection, or the like.' 184 The method of
integration was not considered critical to the invention.'85
The types of plant cells that were covered by the invention, as
set out in the specification, were as follows:
Plant cells which are employed may be either monocots or
dicots and will be chosen in accordance with the manner in
which the desired gene is to be produced and harvested.
Plants which may find use include tobacco, sunflower, corn,
sugar cane, soybean, tomato, alfalfa, mustard, sugar beet,
rapeseed, etc. 186
180. See id. col. 1, lines 22-38.
181. Id. col. 3, lines 44-46.
182. Id. col. 1, lines 36-38.
183. Id. col. 3, lines 39-41.
184. Id. col. 4, lines 44-46.
185. Id. col. 4, lines 47-48.
186. Id. col. 4, lines 55-60. The specification draws a distinction between
"monocots" (monocotyledonous plants) and "dicots" (dicotyledonous plants). Id.
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In the section of the specification entitled "Experimental," a single
example of the invention was disclosed, namely growth of gamma-
interferon in tobacco plants. 87
The Examiner rejected claims 1-9 on the grounds of lack of
enablement, citing 35 U.S.C. § 112.188
C. The Board Decision
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the
Examiner's rejection of claims 1-9.189 The Board found that the
specification did not disclose the particular "plant functional" regu-
latory regions beyond the previously described single example
concerning the regulatory regions functional in tobacco plants. 19°
The Board concluded that as a result, "one of skill in the art could
not replicate the invention in 'all plants."" 9' The Board noted that
the method disclosed in the specification covered only the expres-
sion of a mammalian protein in dicotyledonous plant cells. 192
D. The CAFC Decision
The applicant, Goodman, appealed the Board's decision and
argued before the CAFC that the specification was enabling for the
production of any type of mammalian protein in any type of plant
Monocots and dicots are the two types of angiosperms-plants that bear flowers and pro-
duce seeds enclosed within fruit. There are various distinctions between the two groups,
including that the dicots contain an embryo with two cotyledons, or seed leaves. The
monocots have an embryo with one cotyledon. See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
Angiosperms (1967).
Such important agricultural plants as maize, rice, and wheat are monocots. See
WATSON, supra note 6, at 274.
187. See U.S. Patent No. 4,956,282 col. 8, line 46; col. 9, line 9.
188. See In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In addition, all of
the claims of the invention, claims 1-13, were rejected as obvious. Id.
189. Id. at 1048.
190. See id. at 1049. The Board also rejected claims 10-13, which claimed nucleic
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cell. 193 In support of his argument, Goodman cited several scientif-
ic articles, and argued that these articles established the state of the
art in 1985.94
One of the articles cited by Goodman was by J.P.
Hernalsteens.1 95 The article recognized the success of the recombi-
nant methods of the applicant's invention in dicotyledonous species
of plants ("dicots"), and concluded that there was the possibility
that the method could work with monocotyledonous plants
("monocots"). Another article cited by Goodman was by G.M.S.
Hooykaas-Van Slogteren. It also failed to conclusively state that
the method of the invention could work with monocots, but sug-
gested that more experimentation was necessary in this area. 196
In its decision, however, the CAFC noted that a 1985 article by
Ingo Potrykus "characterize[d] even the modest optimism of
Hernalsteens and Hooykaas as a departure from mainstream expec-
tations."'97 The CAFC further noted that in a 1987 article written
by Goodman himself, Goodman recognized the difficulties in ap-
plying the method of the invention to monocots. In the article, the
applicant stated that "[a]lthough data have been cited that
Agrobacterium can transfer T-DNA to monocotyledonous hosts,
clear evidence of T-DNA integration exists only for asparagus, and,
even in that case, no transformed plants have been described."' 98
In the alternative, Goodman argued that the specification was
enabling with gene transfer by direct DNA uptake by the plant, by
a microinjection method involving the use of micropipette, or by
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1050-51.
195. Id. at 1050. The article relied on by Goodman was J.P. Hernalsteens et al., An
Agrobacterium-Transformed Cell Culture from the Monocot Asparagus Officinalis, 3
EMBO J. 3039-41 (1984).
196. G.M.S. Hooykaas-Van Slogteren et al., Expression of Ti Plasmid Genes in
Monocotyledonous Plants Infected with Agrobacterium Tumefaciens, 311 NATURE 763
(1984).
197. Goodman, 11 F.3d at 1050 (referring to Ingo Potrykus et al., Direct Gene Trans-
fer to Cells of a Graminaceous Monocot, 199 MOLECULAR & GEN. GENETICS 183
(1985)).
198. Id. at 1051 (quoting Robert M. Goodman, Gene Transfer in Crop Improvement,
236 SCIENCE 48, 52 (1987) (citation omitted)) [hereinafter Goodman, Gene Transfer].
19941
36 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
viral-mediated transformation. 199 However, the CAFC noted that
all three methods were recognized as ineffective in Goodman's
1987 article.2 00 The court observed that "[t]he record, especially
Goodman's own article, shows the need for extensive experimenta-
tion to practice the claimed method for just a few plants, let alone
all plant cells as broadly claimed in the application. 2 0' Thus, the
court held that, at the time of filing, the disclosure was not en-
abling for claims 1-9 covering a method of manufacturing mamma-
lian. peptide in all plant cells.2 °2 The court affirmed the decision of
the Board.2 °3
IV. SCOPE OF THE ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENT AFTER IN RE
GOODMAN
As the decision in In re Goodman demonstrates, the key ques-
tion raised by the enablement requirement in cases involving bio-
technology inventions is how much an inventor in the biotechnolo-
gy field can claim. In other words, once the inventor has isolated
the particular inventive composition, or has discovered a new meth-
od of making or using a composition, how broadly can that inven-
tion, be claimed? In cases involving a composition of matter,
should it be limited to the particular protein isolated by the inven-
tor, or is the inventor also entitled to claim other forms of the pro-
tein?
199. See id. at 1051-52.
200. The court noted that Goodman stated in his 1987 article that the "[i]ntegration
into plant chromosomes of foreign DNA introduced by direct uptake is a relatively rare
event .. " Id. at 1051 (quoting Goodman, Gene Transfer, supra note 198, at 52). As
for microinjection, Goodman had stated that "transformation by microinjection of plant
cells only worked with protoplasts." Id. (citing Goodman, Gene Transfer, supra note 198,
at 53). Finally, with regard to viral-mediated transfer, the applicant's article had conclud-
ed that "[iln plants, viral-based vectors are not likely to stably transform plant cells
because integration of viral genes into plant chromosomes has not been detected." Id. at
1051-52 (quoting Goodman, Gene Transfer, supra note 198, at 53).
201. id. at 1052.
202. Id.
203. Id. The court also affirmed the obviousness rejection of claims 1-13. Id. at
1053-54. See infra note 190.
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Applicants in the field of biotechnology often seek claims that
are undeniably broad in the light of the specification. This is due
in part to the highly competitive nature of the biotechnology indus-
try.2°4 The number of patent applications filed in the field of bio-
technology increases annually at approximately twice the rate of
patents in other fields.2 °5 Much of the biotechnology research is
performed at universities and teaching hospitals which place great
emphasis on research and the early publication of discoveries.
206
As a result, "[flrequent and early filings are the most prudent
means to protect new inventions while still conceding to the aca-
demic nature of the university., 20 7
Limiting the scope of patent protection for biotechnological in-
ventions is necessary when one considers the speed with which
scientists are reaching new discoveries in the field. For example,
the biotechnological field of introducing genes with desirable traits
into the human body for treating diseases has developed from "pipe
dream" to "experimental treatment" in only five years.20"
In addition to major advances that have occurred in biotechnol-
ogy, there are a multitude of improvements in the various composi-
tions and processes of biotechnological inventions. These arise
from DNA mutations made to obtain more effective or desirable
organisms, as well as the isolation of DNA sequences that have
greater effectiveness within the organisms.2°9 Enforcement of the
enablement requirement ensures that future advances and discover-
ies are not encompassed by the language of claims issued prior to
their discovery.
In Goodman, as in Amgen21° and Vaeck,1 the court used the
204. See, e.g., Herdman, OTA Testimony/Statement, supra note 7.
205. Id.
206. See Konski, supra note 106.
207. Id.
208. Marcia Barinaga, Steps Taken Toward Improved Vectors for Gene Transfer,
SCIENCE, Nov. 25, 1994, at 1326.
209. Mandel, supra note 44, § 14.2, at 14-3.
210. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991). See discus-
sion supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
211. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See discussion supra notes 143-59
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"undue experimentation" rule of the enablement requirement to
prevent applicants from obtaining or enforcing what the CAFC
considered overly broad patent rights.2"2 In Amgen, the patentee's
ability to provide an enabling disclosure for only a few of the EPO
analogs resulted in a determination that certain broad claims were
invalid on the grounds of lack of enablement. 213 The CAFC based
the decision on its finding that the disclosure of the patent required
undue experimentation in order to obtain the many analogs recited
in the claims.21 4 In Vaeck, the disclosure of examples for only a
single strain of bacteria was not enabling for claims covering the
genus.21 5 Similarly, in Goodman, the CAFC rejected a claim di-
rected to the production of a mammalian peptide in all plant cells,
where the disclosure only provided enablement for a single type of
plant. 2 6 The decision was based on the court's finding that the
disclosure required undue experimentation in order to achieve the
method recited in the claims.217
In re Goodman extends the reasoning of Amgen and Vaeck to
a different type of biotechnological case. The Amgen decision was
limited to claims covering a composition of matter, specifically,
DNA sequences.218 Similarly, the Vaeck decision was limited to
claims for species of genes and other compositions of matter.
Goodman, however, deals only with method claims, namely meth-
ods of manufacturing mammalian peptides in plant cells. Thus, the
CAFC has extended its "undue experimentation" rulings to further
limit the scope of patent protection for biotechnology inventions.
It can be argued that the CAFC's ruling in Goodman is more
appropriate in cases involving claims for a composition of matter
than for cases involving method or process claims. Composition
of matter claims are not limited to any particular method by which
and accompanying text.
212. See In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1051-52 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
213. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213-14.
214. Id. at 1213.
215. See Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 495-96.
216. Goodman, 11 F.3d at 1052.
217. See id.
218. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1204.
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the composition is made or used. 219 Thus, "[c]laims drawn to a
composition of matter would entitle the patent owner to exclude
another from any use of such composition even though the use is
neither disclosed nor claimed in the patent specification. '220 How-
ever, claims for a method or process cover only the method of
manufacture or use which is disclosed by the patent. Indeed, the
patentability of the method claim is in the particular acts or trans-
formation performed on the article or composition of matter.221
Another trend illustrated by Amgen, Vaeck and Goodman is the
refusal of the CAFC to conduct an extensive inquiry into the vari-
ous undue experimentation factors set forth by the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences in Forman.222 In fact, the CAFC in
Amgen stated that the Wands factors "are illustrative, not mandato-
ry. 223 In Goodman, the CAFC made no reference to these factors,
and cited neither Amgen nor Forman.
This development is unfortunate. The factors in Forman pro-
vided a checklist for patent applicants arguing that their patent
disclosure did not require undue experimentation. It provided ap-
plicants with some information, albeit in general categories, as to
what a court or patent examiner would consider, and thus generally
promoted predictability in the law. While the CAFC in Amgen and
Goodman did not reject outright the Forman factors, the CAFC
decisions will leave applicants guessing as to what constitutes un-
due experimentation.
CONCLUSION
Biotechnology is a fast growing field, with scientists around the
world working to discover gene sequences and their uses, and to
perfect new methods of making or using the gene sequences. It is
also characterized by an extensive amount of communication and
219. See 2 ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 8.06, at 8-21.
220. Id.
221. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1972).
222. Ex parte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1986). See
supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
223. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213.
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sharing of results and information among scientists.224 Thus, the
Patent and Trademark Office and the courts must guard against
allowing claims which may encompass subject matter discovered
in the future. As In re Goodman illustrates, the enablement re-
quirement, by limiting applicants to what is disclosed in the patent
or patent application, operates to prevent overbroad interpretations
of claims.
224. See Ellen P. Winner, Enablement in Rapidly Developing Arts-Biotechnology,
70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 608, 611 (1988).
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